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We study whether management practices determine merger and acquisition (M&A) success. We 
model management as an unobserved (latent) variable in a standard microeconomic model of the 
firm and derive firm-year management estimates. We validate these estimates against benchmark 
survey data on management practices and by using Monte Carlo simulation. We show that our 
measure is among the most important determinants of value creation in M&A deals, substantially 
increasing the predictive power of models that explain cumulative abnormal returns. Thus, we 
offer a measure of management practices that identifies the best-performing M&As. Our results 
are robust to the inclusion of acquirer fixed effects and many control variables, and to several 
other sensitivity tests. We identify the Q-theory as the key mechanism driving our results.  
Keywords 




Despite a voluminous literature on merger and acquisition (M&A) success, the main source of 
that success remains an issue of debate. Most of the variables that researchers propose as 
determinants of acquirers’ performance add little explanatory power to models of value creation. 
A main reason is that M&A success relies on firm characteristics that, by their own nature, relate 
to the acquirer’s qualitative management practices (Golubov et al., 2015). This is an element 
difficult to observe or measure. In this study, we first broadly measure management practices 
following its theoretical modelling as an input of production (Lucas, 1978; Bloom et al., 2017). 
Subsequently, we examine their effect of management practices on M&A value creation. We 
show that our measure is among the most important determinants (the sine qua non) of 
cumulated abnormal returns (CARs). We show that our key finding is consistent with the Q-
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theory of M&As, which predicts that acquirers with superior management create value in M&As 
by transferring this management to target firms. 
 The broad definition of “management practices” includes all business decisions and 
leadership elements. According to mainstream management theory (Katz, 1974), there are three 
components of management: human resource management (the ability to interact, communicate, 
motivate, and negotiate), technical abilities (human capital, knowledge, and proficiency), and 
conceptual skills (understanding concepts, develop ideas, and implement strategies). We use the 
term “management practices,” as it is the most general term encompassing the three components.  
To measure management practices, we use the implications of recent literature. 
Specifically, Bloom et al. (2017) build on early models of management by Lucas (1978) and 
Melitz (2003) and show that in addition to capital (physical capital, financial capital, R&D 
expenses, and land) and labor, firms use management practices to achieve their objectives. This 
assumption perfectly aligns with the idea that there are three (instead of two) inputs of 
production and that management complements capital and labor (e.g., Samuelson and Nordhaus, 
2009).  
Following this set of theoretical models, we measure management practices as a latent 
(unobserved) input of firms’ production function (Delis and Tsionas, 2018; Delis et al., 2020). 
The merit of this approach is threefold. First, it incorporates all firms (acquirers) to yield a firm-
year index. Second, it is consistent with both the theoretical economic models of management 
and the broad definition in the management literature. Third, it includes a stochastic term to 
avoid attributing the estimates to other unobserved inputs or to operations efficiency (which in 
the stochastic frontier literature is part of the error term).  
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 Subsequently, our key contribution is to examine the effect of management practices on 
the M&A deals’ CARs. We posit that management is among the most important CAR 
determinants, given good management’s ability to identify lucrative M&A deals and realize them 
in the most efficient way possible. Thus, our baseline specification follows from the extant 
literature on CAR modeling around M&As (e.g., Bao and Edmans, 2011; Golubov et al., 2015), 
with the exception that we add our management index. 
The results of our study indicate that management practices are economically one of the 
most significant explanatory variables of CARs. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase 
in our measure increases the CAR of the average M&A deal by more than 50% in all our 
baseline specifications. Importantly, our results are still potent when including acquirer fixed 
effects. Therefore, our findings suggest that management practices are not merely a firm fixed 
effect. They are time-variant, implying that the dynamics of employment (entry and exit of 
employees), the learning process, and the evolution of human capital are important in defining 
M&A success.  
 Our baseline results survive a large battery of sensitivity tests. Specifically, we first use a 
long list of explanatory variables that the accounting and finance literatures identify as 
significant determinants of CARs. Second, we control for industry characteristics for the 
acquirer, the target, or both, and also conduct our analysis by industry. Third, we use alternative 
time windows to construct CARs, remove outliers by winsorizing our data, include withdrawn 
deals, and examine standard errors from different clustering. Fourth, we look at the role of 
managerial practices in synergistic gains (measured through synergy CARs). Fifth, we examine 
management’s longer-term effects on M&A success using accounting measures of firm 
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performance. In most cases, we identify positive correlations between management practices and 
firm performance post-acquisition, especially concerning return on equity and Tobin’s q.  
 We contend that the key mechanism explaining the strong effect of management practices 
on M&A value creation is the Q-theory of M&As (Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). Specifically, 
we show that firms with better management practices are more likely to pursue M&As, more 
firm value is created with a larger management practices gap between the acquirer and the target, 
and firms with good management tend to acquire firms with bad management. Moreover, the 
cross-sectional dispersion in firm management practices positively affects the likelihood of 
M&As. These findings are economically significant, especially considering the ability of 
acquirers with good management practices to target firms with weaker ones and create value 
from advancing the target’s management practices.    
Our paper makes three interrelated contributions. First and foremost, we show that 
management, when broadly measured, is among the most important determinants of M&A 
success, essentially doubling the power of CAR models. Recent literature, especially Golubov et 
al. (2015), alludes to the idea (as in standard M&A event studies) that including acquirer fixed 
effects markedly increases CAR models’ explanatory power. With our management index we 
explain part of this fixed effect, but we also show the importance of within-firm variations in 
management practices, as the effect on M&A success comes over and above acquirer fixed 
effects. 
Second, we introduce to the relevant literature (e.g., McDonald et al., 2008; Custódio et 
al., 2013; Custódio et al., 2018) a thorough management measure that originates in standard 
microeconomic theory. We eclectically view this measure as a complement of (not a substitute 
for) governance characteristics such as executive compensation and CEO and director experience 
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(especially investment banking experience as in Huang et al., 2014), which are more precise in 
what they aim to measure. 
Third, and related, we bring together three well-established but distinct strands of 
literature in production economics, corporate finance, and management science. The relevant 
production economics literature highlights important aspects of empirically estimating 
production functions (e.g., Greene, 2008; Ackerberg et al., 2006) and management (e.g., Bloom 
and Van Reenen, 2007; 2010). The relevant corporate finance literature examines the driving 
forces behind M&A success and explains a limited part of the variability in abnormal returns 
(e.g., Moeller et al., 2004; Masulis et al., 2007; Aktas et al. 2007; Harford et al., 2012; Born et 
al., 2013; Huang et al., 2014; Golubov et al., 2015). Finally, the relevant management science 
literature introduces the theoretical ideas of dynamic manager capabilities and overall effects on 
performance. The merger of these three strands of literature allows us to explain a significant 
part of M&A success and opens up new pathways for exploring important aspects of financial 
management, both within the borders of a country, but also in the international arena. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 defines management practices, 
briefly discusses existing measures, and provides the model and estimation for our measure. 
Section 3 discusses the sample of M&As and CAR estimation. Section 4 provides the main 
results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses potential economic mechanisms. Section 6 
concludes and provides directions for future research.  
 
2. Management practices: Definition, theory, and measurement 
 
2.1. A broad definition of management practices 
  
Management’s role as a determinant of firm performance is a vivid avenue for academic research 
in economics, finance, and management sciences (e.g., Harris and Holmstrom, 1982; Hermalin 
         
Online Appendix-6 
 
and Weisbach, 1998; Huang et al., 2014; Silva, 2010). Here we define management practices in 
the broadest way possible, closely following micro-founded economic models. Specifically, 
Manne (1965), Lucas (1978), and Bloom et al. (2017) suggest that management should be 
viewed as a separate production factor that has important implications for firm productivity and 
performance.  
Manne (1965) notes that the allocation of production factors to managers with different 
ability explains productivity differences especially in acquisitions. Lucas (1978) is the first to 
explicitly model the management technology as a function of a skill endowment and diminishing 
returns due to their span of control (the manager does not control everything in the firm). Bloom 
et al. (2017) consider management as a technology that enters the production function along with 
other forms of technology, labor, and capital, to contribute to total factor productivity. A 
distinguishing element of the latter model is that management is endogenously determined to 
improve firm performance by, for example, hiring management consultants, spending time 
developing or reinforcing improved organizational processes, investing in continuing education, 
learning-by-doing (experience), or paying for a better CEO. Thus, management practices are not 
fixed and evolve over time. 
This general definition of management also relates to the definition in the management 
science literature (Katz, 1974), which encompasses three key dimensions. The first relates to 
human resource management, which encapsulates the abilities to lead, interact, communicate, 
motivate, and negotiate. Second are technical abilities, which relate to human capital, depth of 
knowledge, and proficiency among CEOs, top executives, and managers. Technical skill implies, 
inter alia, proficiency in all aspects of firm value creation, including M&A deals or choices 
regarding those aiding in completing these deals. Third, conceptual skills include understanding 
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concepts, developing new ideas, and implementing strategies. This involves seeing the enterprise 
as a whole, improving efficiency (the optimal use of inputs), and understanding a firm’s 
relationship with industry, political, social, and economic forces. 
 
2.2. Previous measures of management and recent theory 
 
A number of past studies measure managerial quality based on a firm’s economic outcomes after 
a CEO departs. For example, Hayes and Schaefer (1999) argue that good managers are those 
whose former firms experience negative shocks after their departures. The way a CEO manages 
a company might have long-lasting effects, even after her departure, but one can argue that there 
are also managerial skill differentials and styles among individuals below the CEO level, such as 
among CFOs.  
Another important aspect of studying managerial skill is its multidimensional profile. For 
example, Kaplan et al. (2012) identify two components of managerial practices—general ability 
and execution skills (e.g., communication and interpersonal skills)—and find that CEOs with 
higher general ability and execution skills are better at increasing firm value. 
In M&As, where the allocation of resources is considerable and the risk of heavy losses is 
high (Harford and Li, 2007; Moeller et al., 2005), we expect management practices to play a 
crucial role in creating value for acquirers. However, the literature considers only how distinct 
elements of management affect M&A success. 
Most closely related to our research objectives, for example, is the work on CEO 
experience in M&A deals. Jaffe et al. (2013) document that CEOs who were successful in their 
last deals tend to have higher-performing subsequent acquisitions. Custódio and Metzger (2013) 
and McDonald et al. (2008) find that CEOs who have experience in M&As for specific industries 
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are more likely to increase corporate value. Custódio et al. (2018) document the means through 
which management skill spurs innovation. This expertise could provide management teams with 
better information and superior bargaining power, all of which have positive effects for acquiring 
firms. Hayward (2002) provides similar results from the whole firm (as opposed to CEO). 
However, CEO experience and other corporate governance characteristics do not capture all 
aspects of management practices.
1
 
Additional literature attempts to proxy for management practices via firm size, 
performance indicators, and firm fixed effects. However, performance indicators tend to assume 
everything is the result of managerial skill; clearly this is not the case, because numerous firm 
characteristics and operational processes are outside the managers’ reach. Similarly, fixed effects 
tend to assume all time-invariant firm characteristics are management-related, which again is not 
the case because, inter alia, management practices are not stable over time (Bloom et al., 2017).  
Recent techniques also include frontier-efficiency methods (e.g., data envelopment 
analysis, or DEA) and assume that skill is defined as efficiency if one subtracts variables outside 
the reach of executives and managers, such as firm size and age, market share, ownership status, 
etc. (e.g., Demerjian et al., 2012).
2
  
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007; 2010) and later studies by the same team use survey data 
(the World Management Survey, or WMS) for a limited number of firms worldwide to quantify 
best management practices. These practices focus mostly on plant-level operations and the 
                                                 
1
 Advisors could also affect M&A outcomes. For example, Bao and Edmans (2011) find a positive relationship 
between M&A outcomes and using advisors from U.S. banks. However, this is not the case for cross-border 
acquisitions, as Rajamani et al. (2016) document. They find that employing internationally diversified advisors 
decreases M&A returns. One reason could be that international advisors have less to lose compared to domestic 
ones. 
2
 There might be two problems with this approach. The first is that, especially when using DEA, regressing 
efficiency scores on covariates results in econometric bias and inconsistency (Simar and Wilson, 2007). The second 
problem is that the variables in the second stage never completely capture all firm elements that are beyond 
managerial control (much like performance indicators). This naturally creates omitted-variable bias in the residuals, 
which then include other elements of efficiency besides those that managers control. 
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Delis and Tsionas (2018) estimate management practices using the theoretical 
implications of Lucas (1978) and Bloom et al. (2017). Specifically, their model assumes a cost 
function in which management is an unobserved (latent) input of production. Subsequently, they 
approximate latent management from its latent dynamics and observed firm characteristics, such 
as firm size and input prices (as proxies of investment in management).
 4
 Importantly, they 
validate their model using formal econometric techniques and show that what they measure is 





2.3. Estimating management practices 
 
We estimate management using the theoretical economic models of management (Lucas, 1978; 
Bloom et al., 2017), the broad definition in the management literature (Katz, 1974; many others 
henceforth), and the empirical model of Delis and Tsionas (2018) and Delis et al. (2020). We 
assume that management practices constitute an unobserved (latent) input of production, along 
with observed labor and capital. The latter includes physical capital, financial capital, R&D 
expenses, and land. Our model is stochastic, which allows distinguishing between management 
                                                 
3
 Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) use an evaluation tool designed by a consultancy firm (McKinsey) that is 
composed of 18 management practices (e.g., performance tracking, or managing human capital, inter alia). In 
addition, using an econometric model of productivity, they validate their managerial practices data following a two-
step approach, where they estimate the production function in the first stage and calculate total factor productivity 
(TFP) in the second stage. The free version of WMS is available from the following link: 
http://worldmanagementsurvey.org/survey-data/download-data/ 
4
 The broad definition of management practices that we adopt here is not without shortcomings. Good managers 
produce optimal firm outcomes by managing both tangible and intangible inputs, and our broad definition naturally 
encompasses both. However, if the research objective is to measure the role of intangible inputs (such as corporate 
culture, brand reputation and recognition, strong relationships and business ties, etc.) on firm outcomes, then our 
broad definition and associated measure needs more detailed data. Specifically, any empirical model needs to further 
distinguish between these components of management practices, and this is impossible without detailed survey data 
on specific firms. 
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as a latent input and operations efficiency. In the stochastic frontier models, operations efficiency 
is estimated in relative terms via separating the error term into the inefficiency component and 
the remainder disturbance (e.g., Greene, 2008). 
From a theoretical viewpoint, all modern textbooks list human capital, entrepreneurship, 
or a similar concept as that third factor (e.g., Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2009), and this completes 
the list. Bloom et al. (2017) explicitly model management as that third factor of production 
(again, this completes the list) and show that their model consistently explains productivity and 
performance differences among firms. Corporate governance and management science largely 
revolve around the idea that coordinating inputs requires human resource management, technical 
skills, and conceptual skills in order to gather, allocate, and distribute economic resources or 
consumer products to individuals and other businesses. However, and in stark contrast, “best 
management practices” are missing from the list of inputs needed to estimate production 
relations. 
From an empirical viewpoint, this assumption is in fact testable as in Delis and Tsionas 
(2018), who validate their approach based on a Monte Carlo method. Note that by its very nature 
our model is stochastic, allowing for an unobserved error term (besides the unobserved latent 
variable). This is not just semantics: it shows that a stochastic model is preferable to 
deterministic approaches precisely because the stochastic component also reflects unobserved 
elements other than management. 
Instead of using a cost function as in Delis and Tsionas (2018), we prefer to model a 
production function for three reasons related to simplicity and replicability. First, management 
directly enters the production function as a latent input. In contrast, cost and profit equations are 
functions of input prices (and not input quantities). This implies that an estimation of 
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management (as a variable) needs involved transformations with the cost share equations (the 
cost share of inputs). Second, estimating the production function implies that we do not need 
data on management compensation (i.e., the price of management quality), which in principle is 
another latent variable in the model. This increases the estimation complexity, potentially 
introducing bias in our estimates. Third, the production model perfectly aligns with the 
theoretical model of Bloom et al. (2017). 
The production function takes the form: 













2 + 𝛽𝑘𝑙 ln 𝑘𝑖𝑡 ln 𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑚 ln 𝑘𝑖𝑡 ln𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙𝑚 ln 𝑙𝑖𝑡 ln𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡.        (1) 
In equation 1, q is the output of firm i in year t; k, l, and m are capital, labor, and management 
(inputs); and u is the stochastic disturbance. This is a translog specification including all the 
squared terms and interaction terms, which is preferred because of the appealing properties of 
flexibility and linearity in the parameters (e.g., Greene, 2008).  
To estimate equation (1) we use firm-year data from Compustat for 1980–2016. We 
proxy firm output using the log of sales (Compustat item SALE), which reflects how well 
managers maximize revenue. We estimate management twice, differentiating between models 
with four inputs (Capital, Cost of inventory, Employees, and Net operating leases) and seven 
inputs (adding Net R&D, Purchased goodwill, and Other intangible assets).
5
 To measure capital, 
we use the log of the sum of the dollar amount of net property, plant, and equipment (Compustat 
item PPENT); net operating leases (Demerjian et al., 2012); net R&D (Demerjian et al., 2012; 
                                                 
5
 The reason is that the additional three inputs might bias management estimation in favor of CAR performance. 
Specifically, R&D depreciation rates might differ across firms in ways that might be correlated with future M&A 
value creation. Further, the inclusion of purchased goodwill and other intangible assets as inputs reflecting 
intangible capital might yield measurement error in intangible capital, and this error might be correlated with a 
firm’s past acquisition activity. 
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Lev and Sougiannis, 1996); purchased goodwill (Compustat item GDWL); other intangible 
assets (the difference in the Compustat items INTAN-GDWL); and the cost of inventory 
(Compustat item INVT).
6,7
 To measure labor, we use the log of the number of employees 
(Compustat item EMP). The choice of these inputs is justified based on their contributions to 
sales revenue and managers’ role in determining their level. 
For latent management practices, we assume: 
 𝑚𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛾𝑔
𝐺
𝑔=1 𝜑(𝛼𝑔 + 𝑥
′
𝑖𝑡𝛽𝑔) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡,2,  𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛,  𝑡 = 1, . . . , 𝑇.          (2)  
, where 𝜑(𝑧) =
1
1+𝑒−𝑧
,  𝑧 ∈ ℝ, is a sigmoid activation function and the process is an artificial 
neural network (ANN) with 𝐺 nodes. For identification, we order the intercepts as: 𝛼1 <. . . < 𝛼𝐺. 
Using the marginal likelihood criterion, the best choice is 𝐺 = 5. 
Economics and management theory guide the assumption on the determinants of m in 
equation 2. We assume that latent management practices in equation (2) are a function of lagged 
values of inputs, and current and lagged values of the price of labor p in logs (estimated from the 
ratio of total operating expenses to total number of employees).
8
 In other words, we assume that 
the use of inputs in optimal quantities and their allocation determines the quality of management. 
Also, including the price of labor follows the corporate governance literature identifying 
                                                 
6
 To construct this variable, we follow Demerjian et al. (2012) and use firms’ footnotes in Compustat to calculate 
the discounted present value of future (five years) operating lease payments. The Compustat items for the five lease 
obligations are MRC1-MRC5, and we use a discount rate of 10% in accordance with previous studies. 
7
 We follow the literature to calculate net R&D (e.g., Lev and Sougiannis, 1996; Demerjian et al., 2012). 
Specifically, based on the Compustat item XRD, which measures research and development expense, net R&D is: 
𝑅𝐷𝑐𝑎𝑝 = ∑ (1 + 0.2𝑡) × 𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑥𝑝
0
𝑡=−4 .   
8
 To construct the price of labor, we optimally need information on staff expenses in order to determine the ratio of 
staff expenses to total employees. Unfortunately, the data for staff expenses are missing for many firms in our 
sample. We remedy this problem in two ways. The first is to regress the existing staff-expense observations on total 
operating expenses and predict the missing staff expenses from the fitted values of that regression. For precision, we 
use a model with firm and year fixed effects. The adjusted R-squared is as high as 91%. A simple alternative is to 
construct the price of labor from the ratio of total operating expenses to total number of employees. Irrespective of 
the method, the production function yields highly correlated estimates of management practices (about 96% and 
with perfect rank correlation). In addition, the change in the effect of management practices on M&A value creation 
is minimal. To use the actual data and avoid criticism related to estimation bias, we use the ratio of total operating 
expenses to total number of employees. 
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compensation as a positive correlate of ability and human capital (e.g., Custódio et al., 2013); it 
also serves as an external instrument. Identification through input prices has a long tradition in 
the production economics literature (e.g., Nevo, 2001). In our case, where we assume the labor 




 The system of equations 1 and 2 essentially constitutes a structural equation model 
(SEM) with a latent variable. We estimate this model using Bayesian techniques. Contemporary 
econometrics literature prefers Bayesian methods to standard techniques in the presence of latent 
variables (e.g., Kaplan and Depaoli, 2012; van de Schoot et al., 2014). The key theoretical reason 
for this is that the Bayesian analysis incorporates uncertainty in measurements because of the 
infusion of prior knowledge (if priors are informative) or lack thereof (if priors are 
uninformative) into the prior distributions (e.g., van de Schoot et al., 2014). Given that we need 
one or more variables to approximate management practices, the informative priors help us 
towards a better approximation compared to a standard approach to SEM estimation. From a 
purely practical perspective, estimating our model with standard maximum likelihood encounters 
convergence problems in some of our applications. 




2. where 𝑛 = 50, 𝑞 = 10 which means that 
in a fictitious sample of size 50, 𝜎2
2 is, on average, 1/5. Our results on the effect of management 
                                                 
9
 For the price of labor to be a valid instrument in equation (2), the identification condition is that it is uncorrelated 
with the production function residuals u. For this to hold, we must exclude a number of possibilities. First and 
foremost, the price of labor needs to have a strong effect on m. Theoretically, this must hold, as higher labor prices 
should reflect better management practices in a competitive labor market. Empirically, we find that this is indeed the 
case. Second, these prices should not directly affect (enter) the production of firm output. By construction, the 
production function has this property. Third, and related to the first, the labor market needs to be perfectly 
competitive so that each firm separately has no effect on market prices. The size and depth of the markets 
considered should mean that, at least in our data set, this property is satisfied. Fourth, input prices should vary 
sufficiently to allow for good econometric identification. Our labor prices vary by firm-year so that this condition is 
also met. 
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practices on M&A value creation are not particularly sensitive to these choices. This prior 
ensures that our management estimates take similar values and have similar distributions with 
the corresponding estimates in the WMS database.  
 As is standard practice in the Bayesian literature, we resort to Markov chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) methods for inference (StataCorp, 2017). We implement MCMC using a Gibbs 
sampling for increased efficiency (Gelfand et al., 1990; Andrieu et al., 2010). We run the Gibbs 
sampler for 150,000 iterations and burn the first 50,000 to mitigate possible start-up effects. We 
successfully test convergence using Geweke's (1992) diagnostic; autocorrelation in MCMC 
never exceeds approximately 0.40 for any parameter. We discuss the technical details in the 
Appendix. 
 Using the model described by equations (1) and (2), we obtain a mean value of 
management practices equal to 0.539 and standard deviation equal to 0.126. Also, our measure 
takes values between 0 and 0.968. In table A1 of the online appendix, we report average 
estimates of management practices by industry and year. We observe a similar level of skill 
across industries, which is intuitive as there is a priori no reason that more skillful individuals 
are employed in specific industries.  
 Importantly, we conduct many robustness tests on our management estimates when 
examining the effect of management on CARs in the next section. Further, in addition to the 
validation procedures in Delis and Tsionas (2018) and Delis et al. (2020), we validate our 
measure within our M&A sample.  
 
3. M&A sample, CAR estimation, and summary statistics 
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Having estimated management practices, we subsequently examine whether and how they affect 
M&A value creation. Our key hypothesis is that management practices are one of the most 
important determinants of M&A value creation, due to the superior ability of firms with good 
management to identify value-enhancing M&A deals and execute them effectively. Thus, we 
expect that the inclusion of management practices in CAR models substantially increases their 
power (in terms of the adjusted R-squared). 
We draw M&A data from the Thomson One Banker database for January 1, 1980, to 
December 31, 2016. The data-selection process follows the five restrictions imposed by Fuller et 
al. (2002), Masulis et al. (2007), and Golubov et al. (2015). Specifically, (i) the bidder is a U.S. 
publicly listed company, and the target is either a public, private, or subsidiary U.S. company; 
(ii) the acquisition is complete; (iii) the acquirer owns less than 50% of the target prior to the 
acquisition and 100% after; (iv) the transaction is at least 1% of the bidder’s market 
capitalization 11 days prior to the announcement and it exceeds $1 million in value; and (v) 
multiple deals within the same day for the same acquirer are excluded. 
 We end up with 15,261 events. From this sample, we drop observations lacking 
information on the variables needed to estimate management practices and on some of our 
important controls used in the baseline specifications. Our final sample has 7,721 events.
10
 We 
provide variable definitions and data sources in table 1 and summary statistics in table 2. 
Following Fuller et al. (2002) and Golubov et al. (2015), we carry out our analysis using three 
samples. The first includes all deals (full sample), the second includes acquirers that completed 
at least five deals within a three-year time window (frequent acquirers), and the third includes 
acquirers who completed at least two deals within a three-year window (occasional acquirers). 
                                                 
10
 When we study synergistic gains, the number of observations drops to around 1,011. We expect this because we 
deal with unlisted targets that therefore do not have information in CRSP. 
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This practice allows us to study persistence in acquirers’ returns and use acquirer fixed effects. 
The sample of frequent acquirers includes 1,294 deals, and the sample of occasional acquirers 
includes 5,136 deals. Nonetheless, because the number of observations drops considerably when 
we study synergistic gains, we use the whole sample without distinguishing between frequent 
and occasional acquirers. 
 As in previous studies, we find anemic gains for acquirers. Based on the summary 
statistics of table 2, the mean CAR is about 1.4% and the median is 0.8%. This is not the case for 
target firms, where the mean (median) CARs are 26.5% (23%). For synergies, we have a mean of 
2.4% and a median of 1.5%.
11
 
 Using firm fixed effects is very important because it disentangles the time-invariant firm 
characteristics from our time-variant (firm-year) measure of management practices. In our view, 
management practices, as defined in our context, are dynamic through a learning-by-doing 
process and the addition of new managers and executives. In that sense, and unlike previous 
studies, we examine the role of time-varying, firm-specific management practices in M&A 
success.
12
 Although our focus is on acquirers, in a subsequent section we study how acquirer 
management practices affect combined firm CARs. 
Table 1: Variable definitions and data sources 
Variable Description 
Return variables and antitakeover indexes  
                                                 
11
 Past studies also find positive combined returns (e.g., Andrade et al., 2001; Moeller et al., 2004; Bhagat et al., 
2005; Wang and Xie, 2008). 
12
 This comes at the cost of being unable to conduct any meaningful analysis of target firms and their management 
practices. We limit our sample to firms with repeated acquisitions and, thus, a reduced sample of M&As. The 
sample of targets then becomes quite small because target firm information in Compustat and CRSP is quite limited 
(e.g., if the firm is not public, there is no information in CRSP). Subsequently, when the number of targets 
decreases, the same happens for synergy calculations, as target information from CRSP is needed to measure 
synergy CARs. 
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CAR (-2, +2) – acquirer Five-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of acquirer firm’s stock, i.e. in the (-2, +2) 
days surrounding the announcement date. CAR is calculated using the market model 
and the benchmark is the CRSP value weighted index. Model parameters are estimated 
over (-300, -91) days before the announcement.  
CAR (-2, +2) – target Five-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of target firm’s stock, i.e. in the (-2, +2) 
days surrounding the announcement date. CAR is calculated using the market model 
and the benchmark is the CRSP value weighted index. Model parameters are estimated 
over (-300, -91) days before the announcement 
Synergy CAR (-2, +2) Five-day cumulative abnormal return for both the acquirer and the target for a value-
weighted portfolio. CAR is calculated using the market model and model parameters 
are estimated over (-300, -91) days before the announcement. Acquirer’ and target’s 
weights are based on their market capitalization six trading days before the 
announcement (see Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988). 
GIM index The Governance Index of Gompers et al. (2003) that accounts for 24 anti-takeover 
provisions. 
E-Index The entrenchment index based on Bebchuk et al. (2009).  
Bidder characteristics 
Management practices Estimates of good management practices obtained from a production function and the 
method of Delis and Tsionas (2018). 
Ln(acquirer size) The natural logarithm of the market value of a firm’s equity 11 days prior to the M&A 
announcement date. The data are in million dollars and are obtained from CRSP. 
Run-up Bidder’s market-adjusted buy-and-hold return for the window (-210, -11) days. Data are 
from CRSP. 
Sigma Standard deviation of a bidder’s market-adjusted daily returns for the time window (-
210, -11). Data are from CRSP. 
Free cash flow [(Operating income before depreciation - total interest and related expenses - total 
income taxes - capital expenditures)/(close price x common shares outstanding)]. In 
Compustat coding: [(oibdp - xint - txt -capx)/(prcc_c (x) csho)]. 
Tobin’s q The calculation of Tobin’s q in Compustat is: [at + csho (x) prcc_f – ceq]/at. The values 
are taken for the fiscal year prior to the acquisition. 
Leverage (Total debt in current liabilities + long-term debt)/total assets [Compustat: (dlc + 
dltt)/at]. 
Tech = 1 if both the bidder and the target belong to high tech industries. Based on Faccio and 
Masulis (2005), Masulis et al. (2007), and Harford et al. (2012) tech firms have the 
following four digit SIC codes: 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578, 3661, 3663, 3669, 3671, 3672, 
3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679, 3812, 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829, 4812, 4813, 4899, 
7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, 7379. 
Tech target = 1 if the target belongs to a high tech industry (as defined above) and = 0 otherwise. 
Conglomerate = 1 if the acquirer and the target are in different Fama-French industries and = 0 
otherwise. 
R&D intensity R&D expenses divided by total assets (Compustat: xrd/at). 
R&D high = 1 if R&D intensity for a specific firm is above the industry median and = 0 otherwise. 
ROA Earnings before interest and taxes over total assets (Compustat: ebit/at). The values are 
computed in the fiscal year prior to the acquisition. 
Low_ROA = 1 if the ROA of a firm is lower than the average of the sector and = 0 otherwise. The 
values are computed for the fiscal year prior to the acquisition. 
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ROE Net income over total assets (Compustat: ni/at). The values are computed for the fiscal 
year prior to the acquisition. 
Annual stock return A firm’s stock return on a yearly basis. It is calculated using Compustat data in the 
following manner: [(prcc_f(t)/ajex(t) + dvpsx_f(t)/ ajex(t))/(prcc_f(t-1)/ajex_f(t-1))]. 
See also Custódio et al. (2013). 
CAPX Capital expenditures over total assets (Compustat: capx/at). 
Net profit margin Net income over sales (Compustat: ni/sale).  
Industry sales Herfindahl As in Custódio et al. (2013), this Herfindahl index is based on a firm’s sales. The 
computation utilizes Compustat’s SALE variable. Computations are based on the two-
digit SIC industry codes.  
Deal characteristics 
Relative size The deal value (from Thomson One Banker) divided by the market value (CRSP) 11 
days prior to the deal announcement. 
Relatedness = 1 if bidder and target are in the same two-digit SIC code and = 0 otherwise. Data are 
from Thomson One Banker. 
Friendly merger = 1 if the merger is characterized as such in Thomson One Banker and = 0 otherwise. 
Hostile merger Same as above. 
Neutral merger Same as above. 
Public (cash)  = 1 for acquisition of public targets that have been financed with cash and = 0 
otherwise. Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
Public (stock) = 1 for acquisition of public targets that have been financed with stock and = 0 
otherwise. Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
Private (cash) = 1 for acquisition of private targets that have been financed with cash and = 0 
otherwise. Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
Private (stock) = 1 for acquisition of private targets that have been financed with stock and = 0 
otherwise. Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
Subsidiary (cash) = 1 if acquisition of a subsidiary target that have been finance with cash and = 0 
otherwise. Data are from Thomson One Banker. 
CEO and management team characteristics 
Above vice-president The number of people who are in a position above that of a vice-president in the fiscal 
year prior to the M&A announcement (calculation based on Execucomp data). 
Age1  The average age of the individuals who are above the position of the vice-president in 
the fiscal year prior to the announcement date (data from Execucomp). 
Age2 Executive age in the year prior to the announcement date (data from Compustat). 
Cash pay Total current compensation (Execucomp: total_curr). 
Total pay Total pay for the CEO in thousands of dollars (Execucomp: tdc1). 
Equity pay Restricted stock granted + options granted (in thousands of dollars). In Execucomp: 
rstkgrnt + option_awards_blk_value. 
Variables used for the creation of managerial practices index 
Log sales The natural logarithm of sales (Compustat item: sale). 
Capital The natural logarithm of the sum of the dollar amount of net property, plant, and 
equipment (Compustat item: ppent). 
Net operating leases We use firm’s footnotes in Compustat, to calculate the discounted present value of 
future (five years) operating lease payments. The Compustat items for the five lease 
obligations are MRC1-MRC5 and the discount rate we use is 10%, in accordance with 




Net R&D Based on Compustat item “xrd”, which measures research and development expense, 
net R&D is defined as: 𝑅𝐷𝑐𝑎𝑝 = ∑ (1 + 0.2𝑡) × 𝑅𝐷𝑒𝑥𝑝
0
𝑡=−4 . 
Purchased goodwill This is Compustat item “gdwl”. 
Other intangible assets The difference between Compustat items “intal” and “gdwl”. 
Cost of inventory Compustat item “invt”. 
Employees Number of employees in a firm (Compustat item: emp). 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
CAR (-2, +2) -- acquirer 0.014 0.008 0.091 -0.663 1.486 7,721 
CAR (-1, +1) -- acquirer 0.013 0.006 0.081 -0.675 1.456 7,721 
CAR (-5, +5) -- acquirer 0.014 0.008 0.116 -0.972 1.603 7,721 
CAR (-2, +2) -- target 0.265 0.230 0.250 -1.124 2.910 1,011 
CAR (-1, +1) -- target 0.256 0.219 0.255 -0.988 3.044 1,011 
CAR (-5, +5) -- target 0.286 0.245 0.261 -0.274 2.677 1,010 
CAR (-2, +2) -- synergy 0.024 0.015 0.082 -0.035 0.458 1,011 
CAR (-1, +1) -- synergy 0.023 0.014 0.077 -0.333 0.450 1,011 
CAR (-5, +5) -- synergy 0.027 0.020 0.097 -0.423 0.459 1,010 
Goodwill impairment 0.168 0 0.374 0 1 758 
GIM index 9.533 10 2.805 2 17 563 
E-index 2.382 2 1.189 0 5 642 
Management practices 0.539 0.539 0.126 0 0.968 7,721 
Ln(acquirer size) 6.319 6.294 1.862 0.412 12.978 7,721 
Run-up 0.123 0.100 0.225 -0.994 2.030 7,721 
Sigma 0.030 0.027 0.016   0.007 0.192 7,721 
Free cash flow 0.049 0.033 3.792 -6.621 332.817 7,721 
Tobin's Q 2.194 1.655 2.368 0.258 48.839 7,721 
Leverage 0.221 0.194 0.200 0 1.406 7,721 
TECH 0.308 0 0.462 0 1 4,105 
TECH (target) 0.379 0 0.485 0 1 4,105 
Conglomerate 0.450 0 0.497 0 1 4,105 
RD intensity 0.058 0.034 0.071 0 0.861 4,105 
ROA 0.117 0.119 0.075 -0.057 0.249 7,022 
ROE 0.277 0.269 0.214 -0.181 0.729 7,018 
Annual stock return 1.376 1.071 8.904 0.022 730.446 6,751 
CAPX 0.061 0.040 0.080 0 1.978 6,751 
Net profit margin 0.004 0.051 0.687 -26.856 6.978 6,751 
Industry sales Herfindahl  0.282 0.211 0.233 0.025 1 6,751 
Relative size 0.223 0.088 0.437 0.010 9.817 7,721 
Relatedness 0.602 1 0.489 0 1 7,721 
Friendly merger 0.995 1 0.074 0 1 7,721 
Hostile merger 0.003 0 0.059 0 1 7,721 
Neutral merger 0.001 0 0.038 0 1 7,721 
Public (paid with cash) 0.054 0 0.227 0 1 7,721 
Public (paid with stocks) 0.045 0 0.208 0 1 7,721 
Private (paid with cash) 0.123 0 0.329 0 1 7,721 
Private (paid with stocks) 0.068 0 0.252 0 1 7,721 
Subsidiary (paid with cash) 0.130 0 0.337 0 1 7,721 
Above vice-president 4.996 5 1.605 1 11 1,611 
Average age (above vice-president) 67.761 67.5 6.500 32 91 1,611 
Average age (executives) 53.648 53.667 6.293 35.667 77 1,611 
Cash pay for CEO (in thousand) 1,379.671 992.215 1,646.594 0 32,016.67 1,611 
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Total pay for CEO (in thousand) 4,860.047 2,364.47 9,321.433 0.001 134,437.2 1,611 
Equity pay for CEO (in thousand) 3,087.509 989.555 8,357.176 0 131,348.9 1,611 
 
Variables for accounting profitability models 
ΔROEt→t+3 -0.016 -0.000 0.193 -0.495 0.410 7,018 
Tobin’s Q 2.198 1.642 2.522 0.232 78.565 9,499 
Management practices 0.538 0.538 0.127 0.093 0.968 7,018 
Size 6.047 5.980 1.860 -1.470 13.590 7,018 
Leverage 0.230 0.204 0.210 0 2.137 7,018 
Cash 2,883.722 461.805 16,878.21 0.253 859,671 7,018 
CAPX 0.063 0.040 0.076 -0.008 1.291 7,018 
Friendly merger 0.994 1 0.076 0 1 7,018 
Hostile merger 0.004 0 0.061 0 1 7,018 
Private target 0.492 0 0.500 0 1 7,018 
Public target 0.156 0 0.363 0 1 7,018 
Cash M&A 0.299 0 0.458 0 1 7,018 
Stock M&A 0.139 0 0.346 0 1 7,018 
Relatedness  0.604 1 0.489 0 1 7,018 
TECH (target) 0.286 0 0.452 0 1 7,018 
 
Controls for goodwill impairment models 
Management practices 0.537 0.536 0.125 0.188 0.896 758 
Transaction value 538.290 55 2,417.411 1 40,298.14 758 
Market capitalization 4,196.888 630.598 20,614.61 4.929 355,407.9 758 
Relative size 0.256 0.108 0.584 0.01 9.817 758 
Stock M&A 0.047 0 0.213 0 1 758 
Relatedness 0.607 1 0.489 0 1 758 
Public target 0.141 0 0.348 0 1 758 
TECH (target) 0.198 0 0.399 0 1 758 
 
 Table A2 in the online appendix reports average acquirer CAR (-2, +2) values for 1980–
2016 for 12 different industries. The highest values are in the telephone/TV and consumer 
(durables and nondurables) industries. However, some of these industries perform either 
superbly or very poorly around the events, indicating high volatility. 
 Table 3 reports distributional information on the management practices index and three 
different acquirer CARs (three-, five-, and 11-day windows around an M&A). The statistics 
show that the management quality of the lowest 1% is slightly less than 0.245, but for the top 1% 
this value surpasses 0.8. This indicates that management practices among top performers are 
about 3.42 (0.838/0.245) times better than those among low performers. The range between the 
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75th and 25th quartile is about 0.17 points, which accounts for about one-third of the mean value 
of the management practices index. 
 As expected, there are considerable differences in abnormal returns. For the bottom 1% 
of performers, the returns are negative and span from -29% for CAR (-5, +5) to -18.7% for CAR 
(-1, +1). In contrast, the top 1% performers have returns spanning from 26.2% to 35.6%. Hence, 
the average difference in cumulative returns between the top and bottom performers is about 
54.7%. With an average of 8.2%, the interquartile difference ranges from 6.3% (for the three-day 
window) to 10.5% (for the 11-day window). This indicates that for a market capitalization of 
$3,588 million (the mean in our sample), moving from an acquirer in the first quartile to an 
acquirer in the third quartile results in gains of about $294.2 million. This outcome is in line with 
Golubov et al. (2015), who argue that acquirers are either very good or very bad at mergers, and 
because of this there is a considerable gap between the top and bottom bidders. 
 Solitary events of firms that appear once in our sample can drive this number and thus 
drive our results in a specific direction. We therefore show statistics for frequent and occasional 
acquirers. Occasional acquirers tend to have, on average, slightly lower CAR interquartile ranges 
compared to frequent acquirers (8% versus 8.1%). Hence, the mean interquartile value for 
frequent acquirers translates into almost $292 million. It is worth noticing that the median value 
of CARs is very low (0.67%). That is, the average acquirer has an anemic positive outcome from 
M&A activities, revealing that acquirers are either extremely good or bad performers (similar 
findings occur in Golubov et al., 2015, and Gompers et al., 2010). 
Table 3: Percentile statistics  This table reports distribution characteristics for management practices and 
acquirer CAR measured over different time windows (2 days, 5 days, and 11 days). CAR is calculated based on the 
market model. We report characteristics for the whole sample, for frequent acquirers and for occasional acquirers. 
Definitions of all variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 
Statistics   Management practices CAR (-1, +1) CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-5, +5) 
Panel A: Whole sample 
1st percentile 0.245 -0.187 -0.206 -0.290 
5th percentile 0.334 -0.092 -0.114 -0.158 
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10th percentile 0.378 -0.060 -0.075 -0.107 
25th percentile 0.453 -0.022 -0.029 -0.043 
50th percentile (median) 0.539 0.006 0.007 0.007 
75th percentile 0.625 0.041 0.049 0.062 
90th percentile 0.701 0.093 0.109 0.138 
95th percentile 0.746 0.137 0.160 0.198 
99th percentile 0.838 0.262 0.290 0.356 
p75-p25 (interquartile range) 0.172 0.063 0.078 0.105 
Panel B: Frequent acquirers 
1st percentile 0.250 -0.156 -0.193 -0.285 
5th percentile 0.343 -0.087 -0.113 -0.158 
10th percentile 0.386 -0.061 -0.076 -0.105 
25th percentile 0.454 -0.022 -0.030 -0.043 
50th percentile (median) 0.548 0.007 0.007 0.006 
75th percentile 0.634 0.040 0.049 0.059 
90th percentile 0.698 0.086 0.100 0.126 
95th percentile 0.746 0.118 0.147 0.194 
99th percentile 0.843 0.226 0.266 0.323 
p75-p25 (interquartile range) 0.179 0.063 0.079 0.102 
Panel B: Occasional acquirers 
1st percentile 0.245 -0.171 -0.200 -0.275 
5th percentile 0.333 -0.088 -0.109 -0.154 
10th percentile 0.378 -0.058 -0.074 -0.104 
25th percentile 0.452 -0.021 -0.028 -0.041 
50th percentile (median) 0.539 0.006 0.007 0.008 
75th percentile 0.627 0.039 0.048 0.060 
90th percentile 0.702 0.090 0.105 0.133 
95th percentile 0.745 0.131 0.154 0.192 
99th percentile 0.840 0.246 0.279 0.324 
p75-p25 (interquartile range) 0.175 0.060 0.076 0.102 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Empirical model and results without management 
We now turn to explaining the observed valuation effects with our management practices index. 
The regression for the benchmark model is: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝛹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝛺𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡     (3) 
where 𝛹 and 𝛺 are vectors of firm and deal characteristics, respectively, and 𝜇 and 𝜈 are firm 
and year fixed effects. Definitions for all variables in this model are in table 1, and summary 
statistics are in table 2. 
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 For comparative purposes with benchmark empirical studies, we first estimate a CAR (-2, 
+2) model without our management index (e.g., Masulis et al., 2007; Bao and Edmans, 2011; 
Golubov et al., 2012; Harford et al., 2012). In table 4 we report our findings for the full sample, 
as well as for frequent and occasional acquirers. These findings are very similar to those in the 
benchmark studies. Specifically, acquirer size, buying public targets using stock, and Tobin’s q 
enter with a negative and highly significant coefficient. In contrast, relative size, buying private 
targets using stock, and buying subsidiary targets with cash have a positive and significant effect 
on CARs.
13
 Variables such as Relatedness and Free cash flow have marginally significant effects 
in the full sample. 
What is crucial to notice here is the very low explanatory power of the models, with the 
R-squared and adjusted R-squared being 4.9% and 4.7%, respectively, in the full sample. This 
level of explanatory power is highlighted in Moeller et al. (2004), Masulis et al. (2007), Harford 
et al. (2012), and Golubov et al. (2015), among others. 
Table 4: Benchmark regressions (without management), This table reports OLS results from the estimation 
of equation (9) without management practices. The dependent variable is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day 
event window (-2, +2) around the announcement date. The results are for the whole sample, for frequent acquirers 
(acquirers who have completed at least five acquisitions within a three-year event window), and for occasional 
acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least two acquisitions within a three-year period). CAR calculation is 
based on the market model. The t-statistics are clustered at the firm level (acquirer). Stars ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant term. 
Definitions of all variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 
 Whole sample Frequent Occasional 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln (acquirer size) -0.0038*** -0.0065*** -0.0046*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Run-up -0.0127* -0.0142 -0.0164** 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) 
Sigma 0.2256 0.1141 0.0146 
 (0.165) (0.309) (0.136) 
                                                 
13
 Previous research documents that the payment method for M&As matters. Specifically, Travlos (1987) and Franks 
et al. (1988) find that cumulative abnormal returns are higher when acquirers pay with cash instead of equity. Using 
stock to pay for acquisitions may signal firm internal problems that may decrease the acquirer’s value. That is, firms 
could be overvalued and thus sell their stock (see also Myers and Majluf, 1984; Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Golubov 
et al., 2016). As far as private/subsidiary targets are concerned, Fuller et al. (2002) find higher CARs for firms that 
acquire targets with stock. 
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Relative size 0.0270*** 0.0203** 0.0203*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
Relatedness 0.0031 -0.0049 0.0030 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Friendly merger 0.0245 0.0179 0.0306 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.053) 
Hostile merger 0.0127  0.0151 
 (0.031)  (0.055) 
Neutral merger 0.0284 -0.0109 0.0157 
 (0.041) (0.026) (0.055) 
Public (cash) 0.0025 0.0029 0.0033 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) 
Public (stock) -0.0297*** -0.0344*** -0.0300*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) 
Private (cash) 0.0013 0.0068 0.0006 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
Private (stock) 0.0194*** 0.0089 0.0216*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
Subsidiary (cash) 0.0107*** -0.0067 0.0089** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) 
Free cash flow -0.0000** 0.0184 -0.0000*** 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) 
Tobin’s q -0.0022*** -0.0010 -0.0020*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.0063 -0.0024 -0.0022 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) 
Observations 7,721 1,339 5,328 
R-squared 0.049 0.044 0.042 
Adjusted R-squared 0.047 0.033 0.039 
 
4.2. Baseline results with management 
 
We report our baseline results of the effect of management practices on CAR (-2, +2) in table 5. 
In the first three columns we report results without acquirer and year fixed effects, which we add 
in the last three columns. Management practices enters with the expected positive sign and is 
generally statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient estimate for the full sample and 
without (with) fixed effects equals 8.8% (5.9%). The findings in column (1) indicate that a one-
standard-deviation increase in Management practices (equal to 0.126), increases CAR by 0.011 
(obtained from 0.126*0.088). Given that the mean CAR in our sample is 0.014, this increase is 
about 79%. Similarly, the coefficient on Management practices in column (4) shows that a one-
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standard-deviation increase in Management practices increases CAR by 0.0075. We document 
equivalently large increases for occasional acquirers; for frequent acquirers, the effect of 
management is less potent, but this is likely due to the significantly smaller sample.
14, 15
  
Table 5: Benchmark model with management, This table reports OLS results from the estimation of 
equation (3) with management practices. The dependent variable is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event 
window (-2, +2) around the announcement date. The results are for the whole sample, for frequent acquirers 
(acquirers who have completed at least five acquisitions within a three-year event window), and for occasional 
acquirers (acquirers who have completed at least two acquisitions within a three-year period). CAR calculation is 
based on the market model. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level (acquirer). Stars ***, **, 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The last three specifications include 
firm and year fixed effects. All regressions include a constant term. Definitions of all variables along with their 
sources are in Table 1. 
 Whole sample Frequent Occasional Whole 
sample 
Frequent Occasional 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Management practices 0.0876*** 0.0366** 0.0650*** 0.0592*** 0.0178 0.0544*** 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.011) 
Ln (acquirer size) -0.0039*** -0.0064*** -0.0046*** -0.0108*** -0.0233*** -0.0156*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) 
Run-up -0.0130* -0.0138 -0.0163** -0.0103 -0.0123 -0.0065 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) (0.020) (0.010) 
Sigma 0.2076 0.0995 -0.0002 0.0003 -0.1876 -0.0388 
 (0.163) (0.308) (0.135) (0.199) (0.493) (0.258) 
Relative size 0.0257*** 0.0207** 0.0194*** 0.0194*** 0.0243*** 0.0176*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) 
Relatedness 0.0034 -0.0044 0.0032 0.0031 -0.0120* 0.0016 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) 
Friendly merger 0.0151 0.0180 0.0296 0.0329 0.0425** 0.0461 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.057) (0.042) (0.019) (0.051) 
Hostile merger 0.0021  0.0129 0.0226 0.0279 0.0385 
 (0.034)  (0.059) (0.045) (0.031) (0.054) 
Neutral merger 0.0197 -0.0072 0.0149 0.0316  0.0457 
 (0.043) (0.027) (0.060) (0.045)  (0.056) 
Public (cash) 0.0017 0.0027 0.0024 -0.0015 0.0028 0.0032 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) 
Public (stock) -0.0293*** -0.0354*** -0.0296*** -0.0248*** -0.0410*** -0.0255*** 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) 
Private (cash) 0.0015 0.0070 0.0007 0.0003 0.0032 0.0024 
                                                 
14
 Prior research by Delis and Tsionas (2018) has validated the management practices score via a Monte Carlo 
analysis. They show that this index captures management quality and not something else. Here, we perform another 
validation exercise. We compare the effect of our management practices measure on CARs against the equivalent 
effect of fitted values of management practices computed from the World Management Survey (WMS). This 
exercise also yields a positive relation between the fitted values of management practices and CARs. The results are 
in the online appendix in the detailed discussion of the Bayesian method and in the online appendix table A3.  
15
 To be sure that our results are not driven by extreme values, we rerun our models by winsorizing the continues 
variables. The results are in the online appendix A5 and remain qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged. Further, 
instead of splitting the sample into frequent and infrequent acquirers, in the online table A6 we include the number 
of deals in the past five years and the ratio of dollar value of past deals to acquirer market capitalization. Our 
inferences are very similar to those of the benchmark model. 
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 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) 
Private (stock) 0.0196*** 0.0084 0.0215*** 0.0195*** 0.0022 0.0267*** 
 (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) 
Subsidiary (cash) 0.0102*** -0.0071 0.0085** 0.0039 -0.0159 0.0020 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) 
Free cash flow -0.0000 0.0195 -0.0000 -0.0001** 0.0049 -0.0001** 
 (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) 
Tobin’s q -0.0022*** -0.0010 -0.0020*** -0.0016* -0.0007 -0.0018* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Leverage 0.0040 -0.0044 -0.0041 -0.0121 -0.0501 -0.0243 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.012) (0.030) (0.015) 
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,721 1,339 5,328 6,570 1,294 5,136 
R-squared 0.064 0.047 0.051 0.330 0.263 0.327 
Adjusted R-squared 0.062 0.035 0.048 0.100 0.055 0.086 
 
 To make the importance of our findings more explicit, in online appendix table A4 we 
report the standardized (beta) coefficients for table 5. These statistics allow for a direct 
comparison of the relative effects of the explanatory variables of CARs, showing that 
Management practices is one of the most important variables in explaining a firm’s CAR 
following M&A in the models without fixed effects. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the 
adjusted R-squared of the models in table 5 (0.062) substantially increases compared to the one 
in table 4 (0.047). These results highlight the importance of including our management practices 
index in the CAR model.
16
 
 One objection that may arise in our analysis is whether our score is able to capture 
management practices that are specific to M&As only. For example, past papers have shown that 
firms having directors with investment banking experience are able to identify good M&A deals 
and have positive announcement returns (see e.g., Huang et al., 2014). We argue that this is not 
necessary. The management practices index provided here should be viewed as a general and 
                                                 
16
 In the main specifications, Relatedness is based on the two-digit SIC codes. Two-digit codes could be quite crude 
in determining whether two firms are related, so we replicate this exercise using four-digit SIC codes to construct an 
alternative Relatedness indicator. We find no significant change in our main results (see online table A7 in the 
appendix).  
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robustly measured firm-year managerial efficiency score resulting from standard economic 
theory and estimated through Bayesian techniques. As such, this score can capture general 
management practices of top executives necessary to build the firm environment required to 
succeed in the M&A market; this includes both finding the right deals and increasing firm value. 
As such, our work acts as a complement of these prior studies. 
The role of fixed effects also deserves special mention. The use of fixed effects increases 
the adjusted R-squared by about 3.8 points when using the full sample. Comparing the same 
specifications, the coefficient on Management practices decreases from 0.0876 in models 
without fixed effects to 0.0592 in models with fixed effects. This decrease implies a decline from 
a 0.011 point increase in CAR to a 0.0075 point increase in CAR when increasing Management 
practices by one standard deviation.
17
 The 0.0035 difference is statistically significant at the 1% 
level (obtained from a Hausman test) and indicates that part of Management practices is indeed a 
firm fixed effect. However, three-quarters of the effect of management practices remains, even in 
models with fixed effects. This suggests that the role of management practices differs 
substantially from one acquisition to another. Thus, management practices are dynamic in the 
sense that good management implies adaptation to the unique environment surrounding each 
acquisition. 
 
4.3. Sensitivity to additional control variables and CAR windows 
                                                 
17
 Naturally, the models with fixed effects have fewer observations. If we reestimate the models without fixed 
effects for the sample of the models with fixed effects, there is no change in our inference. Notably, the year fixed 
effects do not play any role in the results (they are jointly insignificant) and any change in the results between the 
first three and the latter three columns of table 5 come from the firm fixed effects. 
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In this section, we explore the robustness of the effect of management practices once we control 
for a series of variables shown to affect CARs in the literature. Essentially, our tests show that 
our management index affects CARs over and above the effect of these variables. 
 First, we look into the role of authority within companies, as corporate governance could 
affect shareholder behavior. Gompers et al. (2003) argue for the importance of balance of power 
and use a governance index (G-index) based on anti-takeover provisions to test their hypothesis. 
Lower G-index indicates relatively democratic firms, and higher values characterize a more 
despotic corporate environment. They find that firms with a higher G-index have lower market 
values. Similarly, Bebchuk et al. (2009) construct an entrenchment index (E-index), which inter 
alia accounts for mergers and charter amendments; they find that increases in this index are 
associated with decreases in market value and abnormal returns.
18
 
 Second, management practices might erroneously capture the effect of time-varying 
corporate governance characteristics, such as compensation and experience of the top-
management team.
19
 We include the relevant variables to control for the aforesaid. 
 Third, we control for several firm-performance variables, such as return on assets (ROA), 
return on equity (ROE), Annual stock return, Net profit margin, capital expenditures as a 
proportion of assets (CAPX), and Industry sales Herfindahl. This could be an important addition 
to our baseline specification because our index should strictly capture management practices and 
not overall firm performance. 
 A last set of additional control variables that could affect the relation between effective 
management and CARs concerns industry characteristics. Several papers allude to the role of 
                                                 
18
 An issue further complicating firm governance is directors’ incentives. For example, Bushman et al. (2004) 
document that directors’ incentives increase with firm complexity and differ with earnings timeliness. 
19
 The top-management team includes individuals above the vice president level who thus are senior executives 
(Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). For relevant empirical studies, see Gabaix and Landier (2008), Terviö (2008), 
Edmans et al. (2009), and Custódio et al. (2013). 
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industry characteristics in M&A value creation. For example, one strand of literature argues that 
efficiency problems occur more often in conglomerates (e.g., Rajan et al., 2000; Scharfstein and 
Stein, 2000). Lang and Stulz (1994) show that multisegment firms have lower Tobin’s q values. 
In the same spirit, Berger and Ofek (1995) argue that conglomerates are worth about 15% less 
than stand-alone firms. On the other hand, conglomerates allocate capital better due to their 
centralized control (e.g., Stein, 1997). Similar arguments exist in the literature on the role of 
technology and innovation. 
 We add three controls to examine whether the acquirer and the target (i) belong to the 
same Fama-French industry (Conglomerate), (ii) belong to high-tech industries (TECH), and (iii) 
have high R&D intensity (RD intensity). Given that our aim is to identify industry characteristics 
that may bias our estimates on Management practices rather than to identify the mere effects of 
industry characteristics, we also saturate the model using Fama-French industry fixed effects. 
 We report results in table 6. Column (1) shows results with governance controls (G-index 
and the E-index). We observe our Management practices score entering with a positive and 
significant coefficient at the 5% level, despite the large decrease in sample size. The value of the 
coefficient is somewhat lower compared to the benchmark model, but this is probably due to the 
large decrease in sample size due to the unavailability of information for newly added indices for 
a number of firms and years. 
 Column (2) shows results including boardroom characteristics. Again, our management 
index enters with a positive and significant coefficient. In this restrictive case, with the many 
control variables and fixed effects, the statistical significance drops due to the smaller sample 
and not the inclusion of the corporate governance controls (which are mostly statistically 
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insignificant). According to the results, a one-standard-deviation increase in Management 
practices is associated with a 0.0045 unit increase in CAR.  
 Column (3) shows results while including firm-performance variables. We find that the 
effect of Management practices changes only slightly from the baseline specifications of table 5, 
indicating that our main finding is robust to the inclusion of firm-performance indicators. In 
terms of economic significance, a one-standard-deviation increase in Management practices 
leads to a 0.0075-point increase in CAR (the same as our baseline specification). As for the 
performance-related variables, we find that Annual stock return and Net profit margin are the 
most important (negative) determinants of M&A success, while ROE and Industry sales 
Herfindahl have some explanatory power. 
 The results regarding Net profit margin are somewhat puzzling, however. We expect that 
firms with more cash flow are more capable of creating firm value through M&As. A potential 
explanation could be that profitability indices do not necessarily capture firm characteristics—
including management practices—that are of high importance in value creation through M&As. 
The negative coefficient on Industry sales Herfindahl could signal inefficiencies that are more 
pronounced in more concentrated sectors, where firms live the quiet life (Hicks, 1935). 
 In column (4) we report results while including industry characteristics. If anything, our 
management practices index enters with a slightly larger coefficient compared to the baseline 
specification. A one-standard-deviation increase in Management practices implies a higher CAR 
(-2, +2) of approximately 0.0081 points. As far as the other controls are concerned, firms with 
higher R&D tend to have higher CAR values, and Conglomerate enters with a negative, yet 
insignificant coefficient. Further, TECH (target) enters with a negative and statistically 
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significant coefficient. We should note here, however, that the large set of fixed effects might 
oversaturate the model and prevent proper identification of the effect of industry characteristics. 
Table 6: Controlling for governance, management characteristics, firm performance, and industry 
characteristics, This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (3) with management practices and 
additional controls for corporate governance, management characteristics, firm performance, and industry 
characteristics. The dependent variable is the bidder’s CAR, based on a two-day event window (-2, +2) around the 
announcement date. The results are for the whole sample. CAR calculation is based on the market model. Standard 
errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level (acquirer). Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All regressions include a constant term. Definitions of all variables along 
with their sources are in Table 1. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Management practices 0.0672** 0.0359* 0.0598*** 0.0645*** 
 (0.032) (0.019) (0.010) (0.014) 
G-index -0.0016    
 (0.006)    
E-index 0.0027    
 (0.010)    
Average age (above VP)  -0.0010   
  (0.001)   
Average age (executives)  0.0014**   
  (0.001)   
# above vice-president  -0.0047**   
  (0.002)   
Cash pay  0.0000   
  (0.000)   
Total pay  -0.0000   
  (0.000)   
Equity pay  0.0000   
  (0.000)   
ROA   0.0215  
   (0.042)  
Low ROA   0.0021  
   (0.005)  
Annual stock return   -0.0001***  
   (0.000)  
CAPX   -0.0077  
   (0.021)  
Net profit margin   -0.0139***  
   (0.005)  
Industry sales Herfindahl   -0.0119*  
   (0.007)  
Conglomerate    -0.0088 
    (0.006) 
TECH (target)    -0.0172** 
    (0.009) 
TECH (both)    0.0079 
    (0.010) 
RD intensity    -0.0943 
    (0.059) 
RD high    0.0131* 
    (0.007) 
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Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Deal controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 488 1,611 6,751 4,105 
R-squared 0.47 0.37 0.349 0.386 
Adjusted R-squared 0.145 0.105 0.133 0.141 
 
 To ensure that event timing does not drive our results, we repeat the previous models 
with CARs calculated over three- and 11-day windows. The results are in table 7 and are similar 
(if not stronger) to those of the baseline models. 
Table 7: Alternative CARs. This table reports OLS results from the estimation of equation (3) with management 
practices. Instead of acquirer’s CAR (-2, +2), we now use CAR (-1, +1) and CAR (-5, +5). Each numbered line 
corresponds to a column in the previous tables. Specifically, lines [1] to [6] of Panel A correspond to columns (1) to 
(6) of Table 5. Lines [7] to [10] correspond to the columns of Table 6. Similarly, for Panel B. Standard errors are 
clustered at the acquirer level. Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Definitions of all variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 





 Panel A: CAR (-1, +1) 
[1] Full sample, FE = No 0.0931*** 0.009 0.069 0.067 7,721 
[2] Frequent, FE = No 0.0427*** 0.015 0.059 0.048 1,339 
[3] Occasional, FE = No 0.0683*** 0.009 0.059 0.056 5,328 






Having studied the impact of management practices on acquirers’ CARs, we next look at firm 
synergies. This is important, as previous research finds that M&As positively affect the 
cumulative abnormal returns of the combined firms (e.g., Andrade et al., 2001) and firm 
productivity (Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001). More recently, Li (2013) suggests that the 
increase in a target’s productivity comes from decreases in capital expenditures, lower labor 
expenditures, and associated efficiency gains, all of which market expectations incorporate. 
These arguments strengthen our insight, whereby the market expects a positive relation between 
the quality of acquirers’ managers and the firm’s post-M&A productivity, efficiency, and 
eventually its value. 
 We calculate synergies following Bradley et al. (1988). We construct a value-weighted 
portfolio for the acquirer and the target, with weights based on market capitalizations of the 
acquirer and the target at the sixth trading day before the announcement (also see Wang and Xie, 
2008). As shown in the online appendix table A8 of the appendix, there is a positive correlation 
among all cumulative abnormal return measures. 
[4] Full sample, FE = Yes 0.0664*** 0.009 0.347 0.124 6,570 
[5] Frequent, FE = Yes 0.0307* 0.018 0.284 0.081 1,294 
[6] Occasional, FE = Yes 0.0613*** 0.010 0.349 0.115 5,136 
[7] Governance  0.0589** 0.027 0.463 0.134 488 
[8] Management  0.0601*** 0.016 0.404 0.152 1,611 
[9] Firm performance  0.0653*** 0.009 0.368 0.159 6,751 
[10] Industry characteristics 0.0605*** 0.012 0.405 0.167 4,105 
 Panel B: CAR (-5, +5) 
[1] Full sample, FE = No 0.0957*** 0.012 0.058 0.056 7,721 
[2] Frequent, FE = No 0.0610** 0.028 0.047 0.036 1,339 
[3] Occasional, FE = No 0.0743*** 0.013 0.049 0.046 5,328 
[4] Full sample, FE = Yes 0.0781*** 0.013 0.345 0.122 6,570 
[5] Frequent, FE = Yes 0.0260 0.032 0.328 0.138 1,294 
[6] Occasional, FE = Yes 0.0670*** 0.014 0.359 0.129 5,136 
[7] Governance  0.0658* 0.039 0.449 0.111 488 
[8] Management  0.0329 0.022 0.366 0.099 1,611 
[9] Firm performance  0.0719*** 0.013 0.355 0.141 6,751 
[10] Industry characteristics 0.0878*** 0.017 0.396 0.155 4,105 
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 To quantify the effect of management practices on synergistic gains, we re-run our main 
specifications where the dependent variable is the synergistic gain for different time windows. 
Because our sample is much smaller now, we do not include firm fixed effects. Comparing tables 
5 and 8, the results look similar: in table 5 the coefficient on management practices is 0.0592 for 




Table 8: Benchmark model with management and synergies, This table reports OLS results from the 
estimation of equation (3) for the whole sample. The dependent variable is synergistic CARs for acquirer and target. 
These are computed based on the market model with their respective weights based on their market capitalizations 
six days prior to the day of announcement. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the acquirer level. Stars 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. All regressions include a constant term. 
Definitions of all variables along with their sources are in Table 1.  
 Synergy CAR(-1, +1) Synergy CAR(-2, +2) Synergy CAR(-5, +5) 
Management practices 0.0630*** 0.0612*** 0.0726*** 0.0683*** 0.0686*** 0.0685*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) 
Ln (acquirer size) -0.0058*** -0.0085*** -0.0057*** -0.0085*** -0.0070*** -0.0095*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Run-up -0.0415** -0.0373** -0.0504*** -0.0490*** -0.0551** -0.0539** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.024) 
Sigma -0.2805 -0.4075 -0.1165 -0.1647 0.1633 0.0536 
 (0.288) (0.376) (0.308) (0.396) (0.345) (0.445) 
Relative size 0.0240*** 0.0212*** 0.0241*** 0.0211*** 0.0256*** 0.0231*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Relatedness 0.0097** 0.0077* 0.0092** 0.0066 0.0146*** 0.0117** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Friendly merger -0.0354 -0.0288 -0.0044 0.0079 0.0590 0.0671 
 (0.062) (0.041) (0.084) (0.066) (0.117) (0.101) 
Hostile merger -0.0143 0.0054 0.0157 0.0393 0.0683 0.0878 
 (0.063) (0.043) (0.085) (0.068) (0.118) (0.103) 
Public (cash) 0.0179*** 0.0114* 0.0174*** 0.0102 0.0196*** 0.0124* 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Public (stock) -0.0125* -0.0156** -0.0094 -0.0128* -0.0119 -0.0171* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Private (cash) 0.0421 0.0387 0.0526* 0.0509* 0.1163*** 0.1116*** 
 (0.039) (0.035) (0.029) (0.026) (0.018) (0.017) 
Private (stock) 0.1024*** 0.0903*** 0.0119 0.0005 -0.0667*** -0.0715*** 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.008) (0.015) (0.011) (0.019) 
Subsidiary (cash) 0.0644*** 0.0704*** 0.0505*** 0.0596*** 0.0663*** 0.0839*** 
 (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.022) (0.008) (0.022) 
Free cash flow 0.0196 0.0101 0.0225 0.0126 0.0147 0.0036 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.024) (0.027) 
Tobin’s q -0.0057*** -0.0054*** -0.0059*** -0.0058*** -0.0069*** -0.0072*** 
                                                 
20
 Because governance and industry characteristics might affect the gains made in synergistic gains, we report results 
including the relevant controls. These can be found in the online appendix tables A9 & A10. By and large, our 
results remain strong even in the inclusion of these controls. 
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 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Leverage 0.0124 0.0078 0.0265* 0.0198 0.0196 0.0096 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) 
Year FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,011 1,010 1,010 
R
2
-adjusted 0.193 0.212 0.178 0.191 0.159 0.169 
 
4.5. Additional robustness tests 
Having established the strong explanatory power of management practices in the CAR models, 
we turn to additional measures of M&A success proposed by the extant literature. We first study 
long-run changes in profitability. In general, we find that our baseline management measures 
have less explanatory power in models of long-term post-acquisition performance. An important 
wrinkle to these findings are the significant effects of management practices on accounting 
measures (forward-looking return on equity and Tobin’s q).
21
 
Specifically, we use the change in ROE over three to five years post-acquisition (ΔROE) 
and Tobin’s q (see Table 1 for definitions). Using such performance measures adds depth to our 
analysis (e.g., Fu et al., 2013), which does not suffer from reduced samples. Nonetheless, we are 
also cautious, as the use of accounting data to appraise the economic performance of firms that 
participate in M&A activities might suffer from noise due to internal (firm-specific) and external 
developments, which make isolating the pure effect of M&As very difficult (e.g., Renneboog 
and Vansteenkiste, 2018).  
We report our results in table 9. In columns (1) and (2) our results show that better 
management practices positively affect ΔROE up to a period of three years post-acquisition. 
Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in management practices, increases ΔROE by 
about 0.03 units (equivalent to 0.007 percentage points). Similarly, in columns (5) and (6) we 
                                                 
21
 All our results in this section become highly significant when we model equation (2) as a function of latent lagged 
management. This is intuitive from an econometric perspective, as long-term performance indicators should 
encompass information about the underlying dynamics (e.g., Arellano, 2003; Baltagi, 2013). 
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find a positive effect of management practices on Tobin’s q. Specifically, a one standard 
deviation increase in management practices increases Tobin’s q by about 0.086 percentage 
points.  
Overall, we find positive correlations between management practices and long-term firm 
performance, even though we should be cautious about interpreting these effects as causal. In the 
years following management practices, these practices change, other corporate events occur, 
firms manage their accounting measures, and the general business and economic environment 
evolves. Still, the identified positive correlations indicate how well-managed firms effectively 
choose their M&A deals. 
Table 9: The effect of management practices on accounting profitability, This table shows the effect of 
management practices measure on acquirers’ accounting profitability. The dependent variables in columns (1) to (4) 
are ROE differences three- and five-years in the future compared to current ROE. The dependent variable in 
columns (5) and (6) is the current value of Tobin’s Q. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, in parentheses. . 
Stars ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Definitions of all 
variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 
 
 Δ𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡→𝑡+3 Δ𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡→𝑡+3 Δ𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡→𝑡+5 Δ𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡→𝑡+5 Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Management practices at t 0.0501** 0.0515** 0.0222 0.0202 0.5876* 0.6802** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) (0.314) (0.324) 
Size  -0.0141***  -0.0116*  -0.7753*** 
  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.115) 
Leverage  -0.1210***  -0.1674***  -0.0053 
  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.182) 
Cash  -0.0000  0.0000  -0.0000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
CAPX  0.1063  0.2045*  0.6529 
  (0.087)  (0.113)  (0.532) 
Friendly merger  0.0066  -0.0202  1.5343 
  (0.069)  (0.069)  (1.334) 
Hostile merger  0.0060  0.0269  1.4057 
  (0.078)  (0.082)  (1.315) 
Private target  -0.0126**  -0.0020  -0.0612 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.051) 
Public target   -0.0081  0.0061  -0.1159 
  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.072) 
Cash M&A  0.0043  -0.0090  -0.0453 
  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.040) 
Stock M&A  0.0043  -0.0027  0.9538*** 
  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.180) 
Relatedness  0.0048  0.0067  0.0210 
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  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.048) 
TECH (target)  -0.0156*  -0.0028  0.1475** 
  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.073) 
       
Observations 7,179 7,018 5,724 5,599 9,698 9,499 
R-squared 0.376 0.378 0.419 0.428 0.468 0.516 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster  Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
 
We have furnished several additional tests to check the robustness of the baseline 
findings. These results can be found in the online appendix that accompanies this work. In most 
of these tests, our results hold. Some of this additional analysis and results include validation 
exercises utilizing the World Management Survey, analysis while accounting for extreme values, 
(double-)clustering at different dimensions, models incorporating goodwill and firm 
innovativeness, and the past acquisitiveness of the acquiring corporation. We also provide results 
with additional governance characteristics (such as board characteristics and the presence of 
institutional blockholders). Finally, we show results utilizing seven instead of four inputs in 
generating management practices scores using Bayesian techniques, as well as Bayesian 
inferences for the benchmark model. 
 
5. Relation with the Q-theory of M&As  
In this section, we explore a theoretical mechanism that explains our findings—the Q-theory of 
mergers (e.g., Jovanovic and Rousseau, 2002). According to this theory, a key motivation for 
acquiring firms is to relocate their assets to the best use possible. That is, mergers are a channel 
that helps capital reallocate to better projects and management. As a result, efficient acquirers 
create value and synergistic gains during takeovers because they transfer their superior 
         
Online Appendix-38 
 
management practices to target firms. Based on these insights, we introduce the following 
testable hypotheses: 
H1: Firms with better management practices should pursue more M&As. 
H2: More value will be created as the gap of managerial quality between the acquirer and 
target increases. 
H3: Firms with good management acquire firms with bad management. 
H4: The cross-sectional dispersion in firm management practices should be positively 
correlated with the likelihood of M&As. 
We form a fifth testable hypothesis based on the insights of Dong et al. (2006), who suggest that 
the evidence on the Q-theory is more prominent in the pre-1990 market. The reason for this is 
that takeovers during the 1980s suffered more from agency issues, while those in the 1990s 
suffered from inefficiency issues. Thus, the evidence is more supportive of the Q-theory during 
the 1980s, while during the 1990s the mis-valuation hypothesis appears to explain better the data.  
Based on this premise, we formulate our fifth hypothesis as follows: 
H5: The effect of management practices should be stronger in the pre-1990 market. 
An important implication of our baseline results is that if better management practices create 
more value, then the involved firms should pursue more M&As. To test this hypothesis, we 
regress the number of M&A events on management practices. We conduct these tests using time 
series data for the acquiring firms; thus, our sample is considerably larger than the respective 
including M&A events only. Because there are many occurrences of zeros (firms do not conduct 
M&As in all years), we use a negative binomial model, which is suitable for over-dispersed 
count data. 
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 We report the results in table 10. We find that management practices carry a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient. The results in column (2) indicate that a one unit increase of 
management practices, increases the difference in the logs of expected counts of M&A events by 
0.422, ceteris paribus, which corresponds to an increase of about 55% (= exp(0.442)). This 
finding is consistent with the Q-theory, which predicts that firms with better management will 
find opportunities to increase their value through synergies with other firms. 
Table 10. Management practices and M&A frequency, The dependent variable is the number of M&A 
events for each firm in each year. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the acquirer’s level. Stars, ***, 
**, and *, indicate significance levels at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Dependent variable Number of annual events 
Estimation method Negative binomial 
 (1) (2) 
Management practices    0.276**     0.422*** 
   (0.131)      (0.148)    
Log assets    0.104***    0.125*** 
   (0.013)      (0.013)    
Leverage   -0.382***   -0.472*** 
  (0.095)     (0.134)    
PPE    0.604***    0.688*** 
   (0.171)      (0.155)    
Taxes 0.058 0.028 
   (0.087)      (0.10)    
ROA    0.766***    0.745*** 
   (0.159)      (0.14)    
Intangibles     1.683***    1.977*** 
  (0.143)     (0.155)    
Cash    1.051***    0.877*** 
   (0.12)      (0.145)    
Tobin’s q     0.031*** 
    (0.011)    
Stock return     0.221*** 
    (0.026)    
Net profit margin     0.039*** 
    (0.010)    
MB  -0.005 
   (0.004)    
   
Observations 69,637 59,781 
Pseudo R
2
 0.06 0.041 
Log-likelihood -36,909.4 -31,266.8 
 
 We test the hypotheses H2-H5 in table 11. Panel A of table 11 presents results for H2 and 
H3. Columns (1)-(3) in this panel, examine whether more value can be created when the gap in 
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the management practices between the acquirer and the target is large (Lang, Stulz, and Walking, 
1989). Using differences in our index between acquirers and targets, as well as the same controls 
and fixed effects (we cannot use acquirer fixed effects because our sample only has 344 
observations), we end up with a coefficient that is positive and statistically significant, again 
consistent with Q-theory. In economic terms, an increase of Δ(Management practices) by one 
standard deviation, increases CAR by about 1.7 percentage points (= 0.0935*0.179). 
 Columns (4)-(6) test the Q-theory prediction that firms with good management will 
acquire firms with bad management. To this end, we construct an indicator variable taking the 
value one for all M&A cases where the target’s management practices are lower than the 
acquirer’s. We then examine whether the management practices of the acquirer have explanatory 
power on that indicator. We find a positive and statistically significant coefficient, indicating that 
a one percent increase in the Management practices score increases by about 3.2% the 
probability that a target company has a lower management score than the acquirer. However 
small the sample, our specification has a good explanatory power for a dichotomous choice 
model, as the pseudo R
2
 is around 0.30. This again shows that our management practices score 
has strong explanatory power when testing Q-theory predictions. 
 Panel B of table 11 tests hypothesis H4. Specifically, we calculate the average 
management practices values in different Fama-French industries for each year. Then, for each 
Fama-French group and year, we count the number of M&A events. Next, we regress the number 
of events on the average values of management practices. We find a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient and our model has good explanatory power. In economic terms, a one 
standard deviation increase in Management practices for the average Fama-French industry is 
accompanied by an 0.8 (= 44.15*0.018) percentage point increase in M&A events in that 
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industry. This indicates that for a sector to be M&A active, interfirm differences in managerial 
quality should exist. This follows the model of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) who suggest that, 
without interfirm dispersion, M&A events do not occur. 
 Panel C of table 11 tests hypothesis H5. We create an indicator variable taking the value 
one for all events that took place before 1990 and interact this variable with our management 
practices score. According to H5, Q-theory is better suited at explaining M&A waves in the 
1980s because during that period agency issues were more pronounced. This might not be the 
case for the waves that followed that period, whereby the misvaluation hypothesis appears to be 
more potent in explaining statistical patterns. If this conjecture is true, we should observe a 
positive coefficient on the interaction term. Indeed, we find that the interaction term enters with a 
positive coefficient, and that it is more potent for the case of frequent acquirers. This could 
indicate that frequent acquirers in the 1980s were more efficient at choosing the right target 
companies to create synergies; especially target companies that might have had agency issues 
and thus not functioning at their fullest capacity. The results of the interaction term for frequent 
acquirers indicate that those acquirers with management practices higher by one unit in the 
period before the 1990s would enjoy higher CARs by about 0.29, compared to acquirers after 
that period.  
Table 11: Additional tests for Q-theory, For panel A, Δ(Management practices) is equal to the difference of 
management practices scores of the acquiring and target firms. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is CAR(-
2, 2), while the dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is an indicator taking value one when the management 
practices (MP) score of the target company is lower than that of the acquiring firm. Fama-French fixed effects 
include 48 industries. For panel B, the dependent variable is the number of acquisition events in each Fama-French 
(12) industry for each year. The management practices score is the average value for each industry and year. For 
panel C, the dependent variable is CAR(-2, 2).The results are for the whole sample, for frequent acquirers (acquirers 
who have completed at least five acquisitions within a three-year event window), and for occasional acquirers 
(acquirers who have completed at least two acquisitions within a three-year period). CAR calculation is based on the 
market model. Pre-1990 takes value one for all events that occurred before 1990. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. Stars, ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Definitions 
of all variables along with their sources are in Table 1. 
Panel A: Management practices differentials between acquirers and targets on value creation, and the tendency of 
acquirers to acquire firms with lower management practices 
Dependent variable CAR(-2, 2) 𝕀{𝑀𝑃𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 < 𝑀𝑃𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟} 
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Estimation method OLS Logit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Δ(Management practices)  0.0538** 0.0811*** 0.0935***    
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.029)    
Management practices    2.8055*** 3.1192*** 3.2118*** 
    (0.264) (0.254) (0.411) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Fama-French industry FE No No Yes No No Yes 
       
Observations 344 344 339 344 328 314 
R-squared 0.144 0.231 0.319    
Adjusted R-squared 0.113 0.106 0.115    
Log pseudolikelihood    -152.988 -130.331 -113.4 
Pseudo R-squared    0.308 0.39 0.446 
       






     
Management practices 
(industry averages by 
year) 
44.510**      
 (22.128)      
Constant -0.532      
 (10.712)      
Year FE Yes      
Fama-French industry FE Yes      
Observations 455      
R-squared 0.703      
Adjusted R-squared 0.66      
       
Panel C: Testing the potency of management practices on M&A value creation before 1990 
Dependent variable CAR(-2, 2)    




   
 (1) (2) (3)    
Management practices (*) 
Pre-1990 
0.0782** 0.2942** 0.0773*    
 (0.032) (0.115) (0.041)    
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes    
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes    
       
Observations 6,570 1,294 5,136    
R-squared 0.33 0.264 0.327    
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This paper contributes to the M&A literature in three interrelated ways. First and most important, 
we measure management practices using standard microeconomic and management theory. We 
show that our measure is one of the most significant explanatory variables in empirical models of 
short-term M&A success. Including management practices substantially increases the 
explanatory power of these models, with a one-standard-deviation upsurge in our index 
increasing CARs by more than 50% around M&A deals. By also looking at longer-term 
measures of M&A success, we identify positive correlations, which are statistically and 
economically significant in models of forward-looking return on equity and Tobin’s q. 
Second, we show that the effect of management practices on M&A success comes over 
and above previously used firm characteristics and governance, as well as time-invariant acquirer 
characteristics. Thus, we contend that the effect of management practices is indeed time-variant 
and not solely attributable to experience, previous success, or other unobserved time-invariant 
firm characteristics.  
Third, we show that our results are explained by the Q-theory of M&As. Specifically, we 
find that acquirers with good management practices pursue more M&As and, importantly, they 
target firms with poor management practices to create value from improving these practices. 
Indeed, we provide evidence that the cross-sectional dimension in firm management practices is 
a positive and economically significant determinant of the likelihood of M&As.    
Overall, we view management as an important component of short-term M&A 
performance that significantly increases the power of relevant empirical models. Future research 
can use this measure as a control in predicting M&As, but also in reexamining the relation 
between management practices and corporate characteristics such as CEO turnover, board 
independence, and female board participation. Further, our analysis provides incentives to 
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reexamine the relation between the quality of managerial practices and executive or employee 
compensation. Finally, our approach to estimating management practices via a latent variable 
model might provide new ideas for modelling notions that, by their own nature, are unobserved 
or related to the management of intangible capital. These include but are not limited to corporate 
social responsibility, corporate culture, and accounting practices such as earnings management 
and profit-shifting. In doing, future studies will be able to also define and estimate management 
practices less broadly and mitigate part of the relevant limitations that our measure inevitably 
faces. We leave these ideas as a desideratum for future research. 
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